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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE OTHER PARAGRAPH(S) 
For over a century now, abundant attention, almost all of it positive, 
has been paid to the magisterial final paragraph of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States.1  It 
was here that Holmes observed that “time has upset many fighting 
faiths,”2 that “the best test of the truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market,”3 and that the 
Constitution “is an experiment, as all life is an experiment,”4 among the 
many ideas packed into this one modestly-sized paragraph. 
All the praise appropriately lavished upon this paragraph has had 
the effect, however, of deflecting attention from the remainder of 
Holmes’s opinion.  More specifically, the common focus on the final 
paragraph has obscured Holmes’s observation four paragraphs earlier 
 
*David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia.   This 
Article is the written and referenced version of my contribution to the Symposium on 
“Abrams at 100: A Reassessment of Holmes’s ‘Great Dissent’” held at the Columbia Law 
School on November 8, 2019. 
 1 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  The well-known exception 
to my characterization of the attention to Holmes’s Abrams dissent as “positive” is John 
H. Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in War-Time 
and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539 (1920), describing the opinion as “poor law” and 
“poor policy,” id. at 539, while also describing Abrams and his co-defendants as “alien 
parasites.”  Id. at 549. 
 2 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 3 Id.  The most thorough examination of what Holmes meant and did not mean by 
this statement is Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
 4 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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that the prosecution was based on “the surreptitious publishing of a silly 
leaflet by an unknown man”5 and by his characterization of the leaflets 
distributed by Jacob Abrams and his colleagues and co-defendants not 
as thoughtful or stirring arguments but as “poor and puny 
anonymities.”6 
These contemptuous descriptions of Abrams and the writings he 
distributed are important but not for the same reason that the lines of 
Holmes’s concluding paragraphs are important.  Rather, Holmes’s 
sneering words are important because they were false and because he 
must have known that they were false.  Yet by using descriptions that 
were as erroneous as they were denigrating, Holmes made things easy 
for himself, clearing a smooth path to his conclusion that Abrams’s 
utterances should be protected by the First Amendment.  And in making 
things easier for himself, Holmes also made it easy—too easy—for 
subsequent advocates and theorists to evade difficult issues about how 
and how much to protect speakers who, like Abrams, are far from silly, 
far from unknown, and far from puny.  Most importantly, Holmes, by his 
disdainful inaccuracies, deflected attention from the central question of 
free speech theory—why and how much to protect speech that is by no 
means harmless.  In dismissing the consequences of the speech that he 
wished to protect, and thus reducing the cost of the protection he 
advocated, Holmes facilitated a persistent and troubling strand of free 
speech argumentation and free speech theory—the view that the First 
Amendment protects speech because it is harmless.  The First 
Amendment does and should protect at least some harmful speech, and 
the First Amendment protects speech not because (or when) it is 
harmless but despite the harm it may cause.7  It becomes more difficult 
to confront when and why that is so, however, if we are lured down the 
false path of harmlessness that Holmes helped to blaze a century ago. 
 
 5 Id. at 628. 
 6 Id. at 629.  It is easy on quick reading to conclude that this was Holmes’s 
characterization of Jacob Abrams and his colleagues, but closer examination of the text 
makes it clear that Holmes was talking about leaflets and not people, even though he 
probably believed it about the people as well.  Id. 
 7 On this framing of one of the central questions—maybe the central question—of 
free speech theory, see C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 
979, 981, 986–93 (1997).  Earlier, see LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).  And, more recently, Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the 
First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81; Frederick Schauer, On the Relation Between 
Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 571 (2011); 
Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992). 
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II.  THE FACTS 
The time has come, a century later, to compare Holmes’s portrayal 
of the Abrams defendants and their speech with reality.  And we can 
start with Holmes’s characterization of the leafletting as 
“surreptitious.”8  Simply put, the characterization is untrue.  5000 
leaflets were printed by Abrams himself on an electric printing press, 
and 9000 had been printed and distributed earlier by Abrams’s co-
defendant Mollie Steimer.9  Most of the leaflets were, indeed, 
anonymously tossed from the top of a tall building, but it is not as if just 
a few were secretly passed in sealed envelopes from one person to 
another in a nonpublic setting.  Perhaps the leafletting could be called 
“surreptitious” in the sense that the leaflets were unsigned or that those 
who tossed the leaflets from the rooftop did not advertise their 
identities.  But the failure of the leafleteers to sign the leaflets or to 
identify themselves at the time of the leafletting seems no more 
surreptitious than the behavior of a mugger who, having taken his 
target’s wallet, runs away without leaving identification.10  By 
describing the act as “surreptitious,” however, Holmes appeared to be 
suggesting something other than the attempts to avoid detection that 
characterize most criminal acts.  But to the extent that Holmes was 
implying that Abrams’s distribution of the leaflets was both small-scale 
and more covert than we see in the mine-run of criminal acts, the 
implication fits poorly with the actual facts. 
 
 8 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 9 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., A Contemporary State Trial—The United States versus 
Jacob Abrams et al., 33 HARV. L. REV. 747, 750 (1920), with corrections made in Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr., A Contemporary State Trial—The United States versus Jacob Abrams et als., 
35 HARV. L. REV. 9, 10–13 (1921).  Chafee describes the press only as a “power” printing 
press, but a steam-powered press would have been unlikely in the rented Manhattan 
(Madison Avenue and 104th Street) basement in which the leaflets were printed.  
Chafee, 33 Harv. L. Rev. at 750.  And on the importance of self-printing to the anarchists 
of the time, see Kathy E. Ferguson, Anarchist Printers and Presses: Material Circuits of 
Politics, 42 POL. THEORY 391 (2014).  
 10 American evidence law is instructive here.  Under Rule 609 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, witnesses can be impeached (that is, their credibility questioned) by 
evidence of past criminal convictions.  Fed. R. Evid. 609.  The rule restricts such use to 
crimes of substantial seriousness, in particular those punishable by one year or more of 
imprisonment.  Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1).  This restriction, however, does not apply to 
crimes involving a “dishonest act or false statement,” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2), but both 
the caselaw (see the lengthy discussion in United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362–65 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) and the comments of the Advisory Committee (F.R. Evid. Advisory 
Committee’s Note to 2006 Amendment to Rule 609) make clear that simply attempting 
to avoid detection does not count as a dishonest act for purposes of the rule.  
Analogously, efforts to avoid identification would not seem alone to count as 
“surreptitious.” 
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Of greater import is the way in which Holmes, again misleadingly, 
sought to trivialize Abrams and his leaflets.  The trivialization starts with 
Holmes’s characterization of the leaflets as the product of “an unknown 
man.”  Singular.  In fact, Jacob Abrams was one of seven defendants 
charged in the indictment, all but one of whom worked together in 
creating and distributing the leaflets.  One, Jacob Schwartz, died just 
before the trial was to commence, possibly as a result of police brutality 
in interrogating him, possibly from pre-existing health issues, and 
possibly from the 1918–1919 flu epidemic.11  Another defendant, 
Gabriel Prober, was acquitted by the jury, the jurors apparently 
believing that Prober, although connected with the political activities of 
Abrams and the others, had nothing to do with the production or 
distribution of the leaflets that provided the basis for the charges.12 
Not only was Abrams part of a group of at least five (Prober aside), 
but that group also had numerous connections with the substantially 
larger and wider movement of militant anarchists and socialists who 
were active in New York at the time.  Specifically, Abrams and his co-
defendant Mollie Steimer, as well as the other defendants, were close 
colleagues of Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, and various other 
radical, albeit less well-known (than Goldman and Berkman), anarchist 
and socialist activists of the 1890 to 1920 period.13  And although many 
members of that larger group were all too often prosecuted and 
persecuted for expressing opinions that would be easily and properly 
protected by the First Amendment today, and although the notorious 
official overreaction to their activities is exemplified by the Palmer 
raids14 and what we now call the “Red Scare,”15 other members of this 
larger group, and at times the same members, not only actively 
encouraged political violence but were also often involved in it.16  At 
times justifying violent actions by describing them as propaganda of the 
 
 11 See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS 
MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 178–79 (2013); RICHARD 
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 88–95 
(1987); Zosa Szajkowski, Double Jeopardy—The Abrams Case, 23 AM. JEWISH ARCHIVES 6, 
10 (1971). 
 12 See POLENBERG, supra note 11, at 48, 124–25, 132, 138.  
 13 Id. at 64, 74, 131–32. 
 14 See STANLEY COBEN, A. MITCHELL PALMER: POLITICIAN (1963). 
 15 See generally BEVERLY GAGE, THE DAY WALL STREET EXPLODED: A STUDY OF AMERICA IN 
ITS FIRST AGE OF TERROR 119–20 (2009); ANN HAGEDORN, SAVAGE PEACE: HOPE AND FEAR IN 
AMERICA, 1919 (2007); ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919–
1920 (1955); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 
1903–1933 (1963); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 352 (1997).  
 16 See generally RICHARD BACH JENSEN, THE BATTLE AGAINST ANARCHIST TERRORISM: AN 
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY, 1878–1934 (2014). 
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deed,17 this loose coalition of largely immigrant New York-based 
anarchists and socialists18 was implicated in no small number of 
bombings and other violent acts.  Alexander Berkman, to take the most 
prominent example, served fourteen years in prison for attempting to 
assassinate—the law called it simply “attempted murder”—Henry Clay 
Frick in 1892 and was likely at the center of politically-motivated 
bombings in 1913 and 1915.19  Emma Goldman was almost certainly a 
co-conspirator with Berkman in the Frick episode,20 sympathized with 
but did not assist (police and public opinion to the contrary) in the 
assassination of President William McKinley in 1901,21 and until (and 
after) she was deported in 1919 frequently spoke about the necessity of 
violence in support of the anarchist cause.22  And although the larger 
group that included Berkman, Goldman, and the Abrams defendants was 
comprised substantially of Jewish immigrants from Russia and Eastern 
and Central Europe, that group also had many connections with the 
Galleanists, the followers of the Italian anarchist Luigi Galleani.23  The 
Galleanists, also predominantly New York based, and possessing a zeal 
that outstripped their bomb-making skills, were responsible for 
numerous bombings from 1915 to 1920, some of which proved fatal to 
some Galleanists and bystanders, even if never to the targets.24 
 
 17 The phrase and its variants (“propaganda by the deed” and “propaganda and the 
deed,” most commonly) had nineteenth century European origins, and was adopted by 
many of the American anarchists.  See generally Dan Colson, Propaganda and the Deed: 
Violence and the Representational Impulse, 55/56 AM. STUDIES 163 (2017); Steve Fraser, 
Propaganda of the Deed, 31 LONDON REV. BKS 4 (February 26, 2009) (reviewing EMMA 
GOLDMAN, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN YEARS (2008)); Marie Fleming, 
Propaganda By the Deed: Terrorism and Anarchist Theory in Late Nineteenth Century 
Europe, in TERRORISM IN EUROPE 8 (Yonah Alexander & Kenneth A. Myers eds., 1982); Mark 
Shirk, The Universal Eye: Anarchist “Propaganda of the Deed” and Development of the 
Modern Surveillance State, 63 INT’L STUDIES Q. 334 (2019).  
 18 A coalition, at least according to my father, that included my grandfather Nandor 
Schauer, who died from influenza at the tail end of the 1918–1919 epidemic.  Even had 
he lived, there is no indication that he was important or influential enough to have 
attracted the attention of the authorities. 
 19 See GAGE, supra note 15, at 56–61; JAMES MCGRATH MORRIS, REVOLUTION BY MURDER: 
EMMA GOLDMAN, ALEXANDER BERKMAN, AND THE PLOT TO KILL HENRY CLAY FRICK (2014). 
 20 See GAGE, supra note 15, at 59; MORRIS, supra note 19. 
 21 EMMA GOLDMAN, LIVING MY LIFE 223 (1931). 
 22 See GAGE, supra note 15, at 37, 103–04, 351 n.5.  See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 
21; KATHY E. FERGUSON, EMMA GOLDMAN: POLITICAL THINKING IN THE STREETS (2011). 
 23 See PAUL AVRICH, SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND 48–57 (1991); 
GAGE, supra note 15, at 207–11; Jeffrey D. Simon, The Forgotten Terrorists: Lessons from 
the History of Terrorism, 20 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 195, 195 (2008). 
 24 GAGE, supra note 15, at 207–58; ROBERT TANZILO, THE MILWAUKEE POLICE STATION 
BOMB OF 1917 (2010).  See generally Adam Quinn, Chronicling Subversion: The Cronaca 
Sovversiva as Both Seditious Rag and Community Paper, 3 RADICAL AMS. 1 (2018). 
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I do not mean to suggest in any way that Abrams and his co-
defendants were guilty of even what they were charged with, especially 
because the charges, and those doing the charging, seemed unable to 
distinguish among support for the Russian Revolution, opposition to the 
Russian Revolution, communism, socialism, anarchism, Bolshevism, 
pacifism, and opposition to the First World War.  The various “isms” 
were lumped together by Attorney General Palmer, much of the press, 
and much of the public, and there can be little doubt that the leaflets, 
which supported the Russian Revolution and explicitly condemned 
German militarism, were treated as if they were simply another version 
of the anti-war and anti-conscription activism that characterized the 
likes of Charles Schenck,25 Eugene Debs,26 and Jacob Frohwerk.27  Nor is 
any of the above to be taken as suggesting that the Abrams defendants 
had anything even faintly resembling a fair trial, particularly because 
Judge Henry Clayton (of Clayton Antitrust Act fame) plainly stifled even 
the most reasonable of defense requests and motions, thus ensuring that 
a guilty verdict would be the outcome.28  Most importantly, none of the 
above should be understood as suggesting that any of the Abrams 
defendants should have in any way been held responsible for the 
violence urged and sometimes committed by Berkman, Goldman, the 
Galleanists, and various others.  
These disclaimers are important, but they should not detract from 
the fact that Abrams was decided, and Holmes’s dissent was written, 
during a period of widespread and highly visible political violence, some 
of it anarchist, some of it socialist, some of it inspired by trade unions, 
and some of it in the service, even if slightly earlier, of various forms of 
anti-war and anti-conscription radical activism.  And although Abrams 
and his co-defendants in the Abrams case should not be held responsible 
for the violent activities of those with whom they acquainted, with 
whom they collaborated in advocacy, and with whom they shared goals 
and political commitments, I do intend to paint a picture of the political 
and social environment of the times that diverges from the impression 
that Holmes wanted to create.  Part of this divergence, to repeat, comes 
from Holmes’s attempts to portray Abrams as a lone dissenter or even 
as part of a very small group of out-of-the-mainstream cranks—the 
lunatic fringe, as it were.  In this, however, Holmes was taking liberties 
 
 25 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 26 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); see also Jill Lepore, Eugene V. Debs and 
the Endurance of Socialism, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 18, 2019. 
 27 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).  On Frohwerk and his case, see 
Frederick Schauer, Every Possible Use of Language?, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 33 
(Geoffrey R. Stone & Lee C. Bollinger eds., 2019). 
 28 HEALY, supra note 11, at 176–80; POLENBERG, supra note 11, at 82–117. 
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with the truth.  Of course, Abrams alone could not have started a 
revolution, initiated a general strike, or done any of the other things the 
fear of which prompted his prosecution.  But nor could any single 
person, or even a group of seven, have started the American, French, or 
Russian revolutions, initiated the rebellion and secession of the 
Confederate states, prevented American entry into the First World War, 
or secured the vote for women.  All of these events required collective 
and accumulative action, and to single out any very small number of 
actors as solely responsible for the production of collective action, 
including collective harms as well as collective benefits, is to fail to 
recognize that many events, harmful or not, are the consequence of 
aggregate actions by multiple agents.  Holmes knew this well,29 and his 
implicit claim that Abrams and his immediate colleagues alone could not 
have caused massive social disruption, while true, is to set up a straw 
that was easy—too easy—to knock down. 
Consequently, a more accurate picture of the era, and thus a more 
faithful picture of what was widely feared at the time, would certainly 
have included the fact that the Yiddish version of the leaflets called for a 
general strike during a time of war.30  And the picture would also include 
a wide range of other violent events that had taken place in recent years.  
Among these events were, for example, general strikes across 1917–
1918 in Springfield, Illinois; Kansas City, Missouri; Waco, Texas; and 
Billings, Montana, these following the more than 3,000 strikes that took 
place between April and October of 1917 alone.31  In addition, the West 
Virginia Coal Wars—with “war” hardly being hyperbolic—commenced 
in 1912 and continued in 1918 and 1919,32 and although the very 
lengthy Paterson Silk Strike of 1913 was largely nonviolent, it too 
resulted in two deaths.33  Accelerating racial violence directed against 
 
 29 Of some relevance here is Holmes’s longstanding awareness of how strikes and 
other large social movements get started, an awareness exemplified in his early and 
anonymously published comment on the British Gas Stokers’ Strike.  See Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., Summary of Events: Great Britain: The Gas-Stokers’ Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 582 
(1873). 
 30 POLENBERG, supra note 11, at 51–55. 
 31 See Paul Michel Taillon, Labour Movements, Trade Unions and Strikes (USA),  
1914-1918 ONLINE INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (Feb. 26, 2017), 
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/labour_movements_trade_unions_
and_strikes_usa?version=1.0.  
 32 See DAVID CORBIN, LIFE, WORK, AND REBELLION IN THE COAL FIELDS: THE SOUTHERN WEST 
VIRGINIA MINERS, 1880–1922 (2d ed. 2015).  See generally ELLIOTT J. GORN, MOTHER JONES: 
THE MOST DANGEROUS WOMAN IN AMERICA (2001); Hoyt N. Wheeler, Mountaineer Mine Wars: 
An Analysis of the West Virginia Mine Wars of 1912–1913 and 1920–1921, 50 BUS. HIST. 
REV. 69 (1976). 
 33 See STEVE GOLIN, THE FRAGILE BRIDGE: PATERSON SILK STRIKE, 1913,  
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African Americans throughout 1919 led to the characterization of the 
middle of that year as “Red Summer,”34 and the years from 1915 to 1920 
were perhaps the period of the greatest degree of Industrial Workers of 
the World (I.W.W.)-inspired activism, some although not much of which 
was violent35 but which produced considerable violent retaliation by 
state and local authorities.36  Similarly, the Boston police went on strike 
on September 9, 1919, just over a month before the Abrams argument, 
producing “several nights of chaos” in which the state’s National Guard 
had fired into a crowd to restore order.37  And although the Centralia 
Massacre did not take place until a day after the Abrams decision was 
delivered,38 it too emphasizes that the period before, during, and 
especially after American entry into the First World War was marked by 
a degree of political and social unrest and violence not seen since.  
Especially given the confluence of the just-described labor unrest, the 
Russian Revolution and its aftermath, the flu epidemic,39 and the violent 
retaliation and repression of the Red Scare, it is hard to imagine anyone 
 
at 104, 180 (1988); ANN HUBER TRIPP, THE I.W.W. AND THE PATERSON SILK STRIKE OF 1913 
(1987). 
 34 See DAVID F. KRUGLER, 1919, THE YEAR OF RACIAL VIOLENCE: HOW AFRICAN AMERICANS 
FOUGHT BACK (2014); CAMERON MCWHIRTER,  RED SUMMER: THE SUMMER OF 1919 AND THE 
AWAKENING OF BLACK AMERICA (2011); MARTIN W. SANDLER, 1919: THE YEAR THAT CHANGED 
AMERICA 65–94 (2019). 
 35 See PAUL FREDERICK BISSENDEN, THE I.W.W.: A STUDY OF AMERICAN SYNDICALISM (1919).  
The I.W.W. was widely believed at the time to be far more violent than it was, a belief 
partly fostered by the rhetoric of its leaders, and even more by the rhetoric of anti-labor 
activists and public officials.  See Joseph R. Conlin, The I.W.W. and the Use of Violence, 51 
WISC. MAGAZINE OF HIST. 316 (1968).  Much, however, turns on the definition of “violent.”  
If “violence” is restricted to direct physical harm to people, then the I.W.W. can plausibly 
be taken at its word in cautioning “against violence.”  RABBAN, supra note 15, at 79.  But 
if “violence” includes the form of “sabotage” that involves the destruction of property, 
id., then understanding the I.W.W. as non-violent is misleading.  The most prominent 
I.W.W. figures were founding member William (Big Bill) Haywood, a victim of Red Scare 
excesses who fled to the Soviet Union in 1920; Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, also an activist 
for women’s rights and one of the founders of the American Civil Liberties Union; and 
Joe Hill, whose almost certainly unjustified Utah murder conviction and execution in 
1915 not only inspired a century of folk songs, legends, and fictional accounts but was 
also likely itself the cause of numerous violent protests. 
 36 See MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE 
WORLD (2d ed., 1988). 
 37 See FRANCIS RUSSELL, A CITY IN TERROR: CALVIN COOLIDGE AND THE 1919 BOSTON POLICE 
STRIKE (1975); STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 
389 (2019). 
 38 The Centralia Massacre, as it is commonly labeled, took place on the first Armistice 
Day (now Veterans Day), November 11, 1919.  See generally TOM COPELAND, THE CENTRALIA 
TRAGEDY OF 1919: ELMER SMITH AND THE WOBBLIES (2011). 
 39 See SUSAN KINGSLEY KENT, THE INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918–1919: A BRIEF HISTORY 
WITH DOCUMENTS (2013). 
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being unaware of the fact that officials and the public were living in a 
period convulsed by exceptional violence and death.40 
The appropriate punctuation mark to all of the foregoing comes 
from two episodes of organized bombings directed against officials and 
other prominent Americans just several months before Abrams was 
argued.  On April 29, 1919, at least thirty-six bombs were sent, 
apparently by several Galleanists and designed to explode on May 1, to 
a wide swath of prominent Americans, including Albert Burleson, the 
Postmaster General; A. Mitchell Palmer, the Attorney General; Federal 
Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis, soon to become Commissioner of 
Baseball; several governors, senators, and members of the House of 
Representatives; and, most relevantly, Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.41  Although some of the bombs did explode and 
cause injury, most of them, including the one intended for Holmes, were 
intercepted before delivery.42  On June 2, however, nine substantially 
larger bombs were sent and successfully delivered, one causing the 
death of a night watchman and several more causing various other 
injuries to staff members of the intended recipients.43  These bombs, one 
of which was again addressed to Attorney General Palmer, were also 
addressed to prominent officials, including, again relevantly, Boston 
state judge Albert Hayden and Massachusetts Congressman Samuel 
Leland Powers, both of whom, especially the latter, likely traveled in the 
same social and intellectual circles as Holmes.44 
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing highly abbreviated 
account of the 1918–1919 American social and political environment 
should be plain.  Fear of political violence was widespread, and even 
though the reactions against it were excessive and oppressive, the fears 
were hardly without basis.  And as the intended recipient of one bomb 
and the acquaintance of other intended and actual recipients, Holmes, 
 
 40 See HEALY, supra note 11, at 117, also noting the New Year’s Eve bombings in 
Philadelphia, a conspiracy to assassinate President Woodrow Wilson, “violent plots to 
overthrow the government in Seattle, Chicago, and Pittsburgh,” and the Boston molasses 
explosion, which was probably not caused by political agitators, contemporaneous 
opinion to the contrary.  See STEPHEN PULEO, DARK TIDE: THE GREAT BOSTON MOLASSES FLOOD 
OF 1919 (2003). 
 41 See AVRICH, supra note 23, at 140–56, 181–95; HEALY, supra note 11,  
at 132–34; MURRAY, supra note 15; POLENBERG, supra note 11, at 162. 
 42 See sources cited in note 41, supra.; see AVRICH, supra note 23, at 142. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id.  That Hayden and Powers were targets makes it even clearer that Holmes, even 
though not one to read the daily newspapers, could not have been unaware of the 
bombings.  And that is so even apart from the fact that one of the undelivered bombs 
was addressed to him. 
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although not a reader of the daily newspapers,45 could not have been 
unaware of the widespread presence of actual and intended political 
violence in the United States. 46  And equally obviously, Holmes was too 
smart and too perceptive not to have recognized that speeches, leaflets, 
and meetings all played a significant role in the spread and organization 
of this actual and intended violence, as well as other events of actual and 
intended substantial disruption, including general strikes and industrial 
sabotage.  That Holmes’s trivialization of Abrams and his colleagues 
departed in important ways from the state of affairs that actually existed 
throughout the country at the time, and that Holmes must have been 
aware of the departure, is the fairest conclusion to be drawn.  That 
conclusion, however, invites the question of why, to which I now turn. 
III.  THE URGE TO TRIVIALIZE 
So what might have led Holmes to trivialize the Abrams defendants 
and their potential impact?  One possibility is that the trivialization 
simply reflected Holmes’s views about death.  As a thrice-wounded Civil 
War veteran, at least once gravely so, Holmes tended to view death with 
equanimity, almost as a matter of chance.47  Such a view would hardly 
be surprising for any survivor of the Civil War, given the inevitability of 
widespread and almost random death in the mass charges that 
characterized much of the fighting in that war.  In downplaying the 
dangers that might come from the extensive advocacy of large-scale 
political violence, therefore, Holmes may simply have been reflecting his 
own perspective on life and death.48 
 
A second possible explanation for Holmes’s underestimation of the 
risks created by the militant anarchist, socialist, and trade union 
activism of the time is that Holmes was seeking to compensate for the 
widespread exaggeration of those risks.  Although that exaggeration 
existed throughout the First World War, and even earlier, it accelerated 
dramatically after the April 28 and June 2 bombings in 1919, partly, and 
not surprisingly, because Attorney General Palmer was himself a target 
 
 45 See David H. Burton, The Curious Correspondence of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
and Franklin Ford, 53 NEW ENG. Q. 196, 201 (1980). 
 46 BUDIANSKY, supra note 37, at 387. 
 47 On Holmes’s fatalism, and its likely cause in Holmes’s Civil War experiences and 
injuries, see G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 49–
86 (1993).  See also David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 
44 DUKE L.J. 449, 469 (1994). 
 48 Never having myself confronted the possibility of imminent death, except 
actuarily, I offer no views on how Holmes (or anyone else, for that matter) might react 
to having had such confrontations on multiple occasions. 
SCHAUER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  10:35 PM 
2020] THE ORIGINS OF THE HARMLESS SPEECH TRADITION 215 
of both of those bombing attempts.49  So although the dangers were real, 
so too was the official exaggeration of them.50  The dangers of anarchist 
and related violence plainly existed, but those dangers were neither as 
probabilistically great nor as temporally immediate as Attorney General 
Palmer, his chief subordinate J. Edgar Hoover, most other officials, much 
of the media, and most people believed and portrayed.51  To the extent 
that Holmes was genuinely concerned with the widespread 
exaggeration of the dangers, and it is pretty clear that he was,52 he may 
well have thought it crucial to downplay the dangers as a way of 
attempting to counteract what he might have perceived as an unjustified 
panic exacerbated by the government and accepted by the public. 
But perhaps there is something more to Holmes’s trivialization of 
Abrams and the efforts of those like him than merely Holmes’s fatalism 
and his possible desire to counteract a government-fueled hysteria.  To 
explore what this something more might be, we must start with 
Holmes’s initial decision to dissent and thus his conclusion that Abrams 
and his co-defendants should not have been convicted.  Moreover, and 
as has been amply documented,53  Holmes had also decided that the First 
Amendment would motivate this conclusion.  Assuming that Holmes 
had initially concluded that the First Amendment required reversal of 
the Abrams convictions, he then faced two options.  He could have 
acknowledged that the Abrams defendants were indeed dangerous54 but 
 
 49 See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 50 Thus, Holmes may have been engaging, sub silentio, in the kind of risk analysis of 
free speech problems urged in Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, 
Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 51 See Allan L. Damon, The Great Red Scare, 19 AMERICAN HERITAGE, Feb. 1968,  
at 22–27, 75–77; see also MURRAY, supra note 15; SANDLER, supra note 34, at 95–118; 
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 
TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 220–26 (2004). 
 52 See BUDIANSKY, supra note 37, at 387, 460.  
 53 See HEALY, supra note 11; see also David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis 
of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97 (1982). 
 54 It is intriguing to speculate about the standard that Holmes used to evaluate the 
extent of the danger.  Under what later came to be understood as rational basis scrutiny, 
see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), see generally Dana 
Berliner, The Federal Rational Basis Test—Fact and Fiction, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373 
(2016), a standard arguably inspired by the acceptance of Holmes’s dissent in Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), Holmes could have concluded 
that legislative determinations about the dangers of advocacy of a certain type, 
determinations embodied in the 1918 amendment to the Espionage Act of 1917, were 
entitled to substantial deference.  Indeed, such a conclusion might be seen as underlying 
the toothless version of clear and present danger that Holmes applied in Schenck, Debs, 
and Frohwerk.  By implicitly rejecting this approach in Abrams, however, Holmes could 
be seen as paving the way for what we would now consider heightened scrutiny, see 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1278–79 (2007); Tara 
SCHAUER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  10:35 PM 
216 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:205 
then argued that the First Amendment nevertheless protected their 
dangerous activity.55  Alternatively, Holmes could have argued that the 
Abrams defendants were simply not dangerous at all, making restriction 
of their speech pointless at the outset, with the First Amendment being 
the receptacle for the conclusion that an empirically pointless 
prosecution could not be upheld. 
The language that Holmes used to describe the Abrams defendants 
plainly supports the latter explanation.  And, interestingly, so too does 
much of what we know about the psychology of human decision-
making.  Although a great deal of our lives involves negotiating 
conflicting goals, desires, reasons, and principles, doing so is often a task 
that is as unpleasant as it is difficult.  In order to make the task easier 
and reduce the unpleasantness, hardly a surprising motivation, we turn 
out to be prone to conceptually define or empirically perceive one of the 
choices in such a way as not to conflict, or at least to conflict less, with 
the other.56  The label for the well-known phenomenon, a label often 
overused or misused by people who know little more than the label, is 
cognitive dissonance, and it is one of the more longstanding and most 
durable experimental findings in cognitive and social psychology.57 
A possible locus of cognitive dissonance, and thus of people’s desire 
to seek cognitive consistency,58 is the tension between protecting 
 
Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475 
(2016), even of legislative factual determinations, for restrictions of constitutional 
rights in general, and First Amendment rights in particular.  See Thomas Healy, 
Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 704–13 (2009). 
 55 For the argument that Holmes did precisely this—that he created “a privilege to 
cause harm”—but shouldn’t have, see Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The 
Legacy of Justice Holmes for First Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
661, 707 (2011). 
 56 For my own analysis of the phenomenon, with examples from various legal and 
constitutional topics, see Frederick Schauer, Rights, Constitutions and the Perils of 
Panglossianism, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 635 (2018). 
 57 Dissonance theory is ordinarily associated with the findings, originally, in LEON 
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957), and further developed in LEON 
FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE (1964); Leon Festinger, Some Attitudinal 
Consequences of Forced Decisions, 15 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 389 (1959).  Also among the 
earlier sources is J.W. Brehm, Postdecision Changes in the Desirability of Alternatives, 52 
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 384 (1956).  For more recent overviews and evaluation, see JOEL 
COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY (2007); Elliot Aronson, The 
Return of the Repressed: Dissonance Theory Makes a Comeback, 3 PSYCH. INQ. 303 (1992). 
 58 On cognitive consistency, the desire of people to avoid cognitive dissonance and 
thus to look for agreement and coherence between conflicting beliefs, see generally 
ROBERT P. ABELSON, THEORIES OF COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: A SOURCEBOOK (1968); BERTRAM 
GAWRONSKI & FRITZ STRACK, COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN SOCIAL 
COGNITION (2012); Bertram Gawronski & Skylar M. Brannon, What is Cognitive 
Consistency, and Why Does It Matter?, in COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: REEXAMINING A PIVOTAL 
THEORY IN PSYCHOLOGY 91 (Eddie P. Harmon-Jones ed., Am. Psychol. Ass’n 2019).  But for a 
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someone or something and believing that the person or thing we are 
protecting is dangerous.  Concretely, therefore, it is at least plausible, 
especially in 1919,59 that protecting speech and believing it dangerous 
would be seen as inconsistent and, even more concretely, that 
protecting Abrams and his leaflets while also believing them dangerous 
would therefore be seen as inconsistent.  The remedy for this, for 
someone who believed that Abrams and the other defendants should 
not be convicted and for someone unwilling (or not yet conceptually 
empowered) to argue that harmful speech should be protected by the 
First Amendment, is thus to insist that the speech was not in fact 
harmful, reasonable views to the contrary notwithstanding. 
If we accept, as I have tried to show, that Holmes’s portrayal of the 
potential harms of the defendants and their leaflets was at least 
somewhat misleadingly understated, then the three possibilities I have 
just suggested—relative imperviousness to danger because of his own 
experiences, counteracting what he perceived as government 
overreaction to anarchist and socialist violence, and the search for 
cognitive consistency between constitutional immunity and the degree 
of danger of the immunized conduct—offer themselves as possible 
explanations.  And without the ability to peer into Holmes’s mind a 
century after the fact, and more than eighty years after his death, there 
is no way to settle on which of these—or others—might have been the 
actual explanation.  This, however, is about the possible causes of 
Holmes’s characterizations of the Abrams defendants.  Yet perhaps of 
even greater import is the question of the consequences of those 
characterizations. 
 
skeptical dissent, see Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Cognitive Consistency Theory in Social 
Psychology: A Paradigm Reconsidered, 29 PSYCH. INQ. 45 (2018). 
 59 Recent and not-so-recent cases have highlighted the First Amendment’s 
protection of likely harmful speech.  See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 
(2012) (protecting intentional factually false statements by a local board member in a 
public meeting); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) 
(protecting violent interactive video games); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
(protecting display of homophobic signs at a military funeral); United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460 (2010) (protecting the sale and possession of videos depicting animal 
cruelty); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (protecting advocacy of violence 
against African-Americans and Jews).  But such applications of the First Amendment 
were far in the future in 1919.  Indeed, it may well be that Brandenburg and Ocala Star 
Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (protecting plainly damaging and plainly 
factually false libel), are the first Supreme Court cases applying the First Amendment to 
protect uncontroversially harmful speech. 
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IV.  THE “HARMLESS SPEECH” TRADITION 
Holmes’s decision to write a dissenting opinion in support of the 
Abrams defendants, and thus to depart from his less speech-protective 
conclusions in Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk, has been so well-
documented60 that it need not be rehearsed here.  But having made the 
decision to dissent, and having decided to do so on First Amendment 
grounds, it was still open to Holmes to choose just how to characterize 
the defendants and their speech.  One option would have been to 
describe with slightly greater accuracy than he actually did the milieu in 
which Abrams and the others operated.  But if Holmes had faithfully 
depicted the environment of fear described above, he would then have 
faced the formidable task, especially formidable in 1919,61 of explaining 
why the Constitution and the First Amendment should provide special 
protection for potentially harm-causing behavior.62  And whether 
Holmes avoided that formidable task because of the desire for cognitive 
consistency between protection and harmlessness or whether instead 
the avoidance was a function of the fact that neither Holmes nor the 
world of free speech theory yet possessed the theoretical resources to 
make that case, he still chose the characterization that made the task far 
less formidable.  In doing so, however, he also made things too easy for 
theorists and advocates in the ensuing century, theorists and advocates 
who seem to have been only too eager to embrace the harmless speech 
tradition. 
Speech can harm.  The time-honored “sticks and stones may break 
my bones, but names can never hurt me” mantra notwithstanding, 
words (and pictures) possess the manifested capacity to produce a 
range of psychic, emotional, and more concrete injuries.  Some of those 
injuries are direct, and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, even though now tightly constrained by First Amendment 
doctrine,63 embodies the idea that being the target of words and images 
 
 60 BUDIANSKY, supra note 37, at 390–95; HEALY, supra note 11; POLENBERG, supra note 
11, at 197–242. 
 61 See supra notes 53 and 59. 
 62 The now-classic statement of the basic idea is in Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 204 (1972): “[O]n any very strong version 
of the doctrine [of freedom of expression] there will be cases where protected acts are 
held to be immune from restriction despite the fact that they have as consequences 
harms which would normally be sufficient to justify the imposition of legal sanctions.”  
On the idea of special protection for speech, and not simply thinking of free speech as an 
instantiation of a broader principle of general liberty, see Frederick Schauer, Free Speech 
on Tuesdays, 34 L. & PHIL. 119 (2015); Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction Between 
Speech and Action, 65 EMORY L.J. 427 (2015).  
 63 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46 (1988).  See generally David Crump, Rethinking Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
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may produce feelings of distress equivalent to or greater than some of 
the distresses produced by physical contact.  And some speech-
produced injuries are mediated by listeners or viewers who respond to 
speech by causing harm even while not themselves being the victims of 
it.  In particular, the harms coming from advocacy or incitement are 
mediated harms of this variety.  If any of the Klansmen who heard 
Clarence Brandenburg’s speech had proceeded, inspired by that speech, 
actually to commit acts of “revengeance” against African Americans and 
Jews,64 it would be hard to deny that the Brandenburg’s speech had 
caused harm, even though the harm was mediated by the listeners and 
their subsequent conduct. 
This is not the occasion to delve any more deeply into the ways that 
speech can harm, in part because I have done so on previous occasions65 
and in part because that vast topic, in its full vastness, is neither the 
focus of this Article nor of the event that inspired it—commemorating 
the Abrams dissent.  But noting that speech can harm is important here 
because of the longstanding tradition of denying the harm-producing 
capacities of speech, a tradition that I want to label the “harmless speech 
tradition.”  And it is a tradition that may owe much, although the 
causation is far from clear, to the language that Holmes used in Abrams 
to characterize the defendants and their speech. 
The view that speech, especially the speech that is worthy of 
protection, is harmless, and thus protected because it is harmless, comes 
in many versions.66  The crudest version, of which the “sticks and 
stones” adage is emblematic, presumes that the kind of mental distress 
often caused by words is different in kind and lesser in degree than the 
kinds of harms caused by physical injury.  Of course, being shot is more 
harmful than being called, say, selfish, rude, unfashionable, or a bad 
golfer.  But being the target of a racial epithet—or being reminded by an 
 
Distress, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 287 (2018); Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Sticks and Stones May Break 
My Bones But Extreme and Outrageous Conduct Will Never Hurt Me: The Demise of 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in the Aftermath of Snyder v. Phelps, 
57 WAYNE L. REV. 473 (2011); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300 (2010). 
 64 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969). 
 65 See Frederick Schauer, Expression and Its Consequences, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 705 
(2007); Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81; 
Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635 (1993) 
[hereinafter Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm]. 
 66 I put aside the claim that speech is protected only when it is harmless, see generally 
Jan Narveson, Freedom of Speech and Expression: A Libertarian View, in FREE EXPRESSION: 
ESSAYS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 59 (W.J. WALUCHOW ED., 1994), and I do so because that view, 
its philosophical merits and demerits aside, maps so poorly with American First 
Amendment doctrine. 
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epithet of one’s physical or mental deficiencies—may, for some people, 
produce more mental anguish than being pushed to the ground or 
slapped in the face, both of which can be the basis of criminal and civil 
liability.67  And if it is the case that some speech-produced mental 
distress is greater than the pain or mental anguish produced by some 
forms of physical contact, or, for that matter, greater than some financial 
losses, then the question is whether there is reason to believe that 
speech is systematically less harmful than the remainder of human 
action.  Indeed, although some have made exactly this claim,68 it is 
difficult to see how it could be supported.  It is, of course, true that most 
speech is harmless, but it is also true that most nonspeech conduct is 
harmless.  And whether the subset of conduct (or action) that is speech 
is more or less potentially harmful than the subset that is not speech—
whether the category of largely harmless speech is larger or smaller, 
absolutely or proportionately, than the category of largely harmless 
conduct—is simply an assertion that can neither be proved nor denied. 
The version of the harmless speech claim to which I have just 
alluded is the claim in its least plausible version.  Slightly more plausible 
is the version of the claim that aims to deny, often by distinguishing 
harm from “mere” offense,69 the harms that may ensue when listeners, 
observers, or readers suffer some form of distress by virtue of what they 
read or hear or observe.70  The basic idea, which is captured, I hope, by 
my comparison of being slapped in the face with being the target of an 
epithet, is that sometimes people feel distress when they are so 
targeted.71  The question, then, is whether this distress is necessarily or 
 
 67 On a slap in the face as actionable, see, for example, Leger v. Delahoussaye, 464 
So. 2d 1, 4 (La. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Althof, No. B155550, 2002 WL 31303535, at 4 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (citing People v. Rocha, 479 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1971)). 
 68 “[W]e could reasonably decide that speech is less likely to cause direct or 
immediate harm to the interests of others . . . than is purely physical conduct . . . .”  
MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19 (1984) (footnote 
omitted).  “It is almost certainly true in the overwhelming majority of cases that speech 
is less immediately dangerous than conduct.”  Id. at 19 n.48.  See also Michael Bayles, 
Mid-Level Principles and Justification, in 28 NOMOS 49, 54 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., 1986).  For other examples and analysis, see Schauer, The Phenomenology 
of Speech and Harm, supra note 65. 
 69 A powerful challenge to the distinction between harm and offense is Larry 
Alexander, Harm, Offense, and Morality, 7 CAN. J.L. & JURISP. 199 (1994).  But if the 
distinction between harm and offense is fragile, then this fragility might lead to 
Alexander’s conclusion that the merely offensive ought not to be regulated.  But it also 
might lead to the opposite conclusion that the label “offense” is often tendentiously 
attached to regulable harms. 
 70 See David S. Han, The Mechanics of First Amendment Audience Analysis, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1647, 1660 (2014). 
 71 If the distress is unaccompanied by any significant or lasting pain, then it is not 
clear why being painlessly slapped can ground a cause of action, which it can, while 
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systematically less consequential than the kinds of physically produced 
distresses that are routinely understood to justify legal sanctions. 
In response to claims of this kind of distress, a common maneuver 
is to attribute the distress to some weakness on the part of the target.  
The targets are being “thin-skinned,” so it is said,72 and it is not as if 
being the target of an epithet or insult is really, truly, or genuinely 
harmful.  One branch of the harmless speech tradition, therefore, 
focuses on the claims of direct injury and insists that those injuries are, 
if not nonexistent, at the very least rare and typically exaggerated. 
Another branch of the harmless speech tradition focuses on 
mediated harms, as described above—that is, harms caused by a 
listener (or reader) and not directly by the speaker.  With respect to 
such mediated harms, the harmless speech tradition can be further 
subdivided into three subbranches.  One of the subbranches, and the one 
of least interest here, implicitly acknowledges the causation between 
the speech and some subsequent act but denies that there is anything 
harmful in the subsequent act.  Even if it is true, for example, as 
nineteenth-century English obscenity law supposed, that sexually 
explicit imagery caused teenage boys to masturbate, it is, to put it mildly, 
hardly clear that there is anything to worry about in the ultimate 
conduct, the views of Victorian England (and late nineteenth-century 
United States) notwithstanding.73  And thus, the objection to obscenity 
law, whether in nineteenth-century or modern versions, is sometimes 
just the objection to an official concern about the conduct portrayed or 
encouraged, apart from the question of whether the images did or did 
not increase the incidence of the conduct.74  In the context of cases like 
 
being (physically) painlessly insulted face to face cannot.  So, too, with spitting.  If 
someone spits in my face and the spittle makes contact with my skin, I have suffered an 
actionable battery.  But if the spittle misses, I have no legal remedy, even though the 
injury in the former case is mostly (questions of disgust aside) a function of my having 
been insulted.  
 72 Often.  See, e.g., RODNEY SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS (1986) (entitling an entire chapter 
“The Thinning of American Skin”); Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Speech Narcissism, 
70 FLA. L. REV. 839, 848 (2018); Donald E. Lively, Fear and Media: A First Amendment 
Horror Show, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1090 (1985); Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, 
Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 
83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1113 (2003). 
 73 See NOEL PERRIN, DR. BOWDLER’S LEGACY: A HISTORY OF EXPURGATED BOOKS IN ENGLAND 
AND AMERICA 164, 251 (1969); FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 7–8 (1976). 
 74 See, e.g., EDWARD DE GRAZIA & ROGER K. NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS: MOVIES, CENSORS AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 135, 287 (1982).  Generalizing from the example in the text, it may 
be that at least some objections to extremely sexually explicit images in films, books, and 
magazines are objections based on the premise that the proliferation of such images will 
increase the incidence, societally, of nonprocreative sex, sex outside of marriage, or 
unconventional sexual practices.  The basic point is that the empirical question of 
causation should not be confused with the normative evaluation of what is caused.  
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Schenck, therefore, this subbranch of the harmless speech tradition 
might acknowledge that there was a causal relationship between 
Schenck’s anti-conscription advocacy and the incidence of draft 
resistance but that the draft itself was either immoral or unnecessary.  
The speech would be considered harmless, therefore, because the 
conduct it produced was not itself harmful. 
The second subbranch of the harmless speech tradition when 
applied to mediated harms is one that seeks to deny the causal 
relationship.  For example, the debate in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n75 between Justice Scalia for the majority76 and Justice 
Breyer, dissenting,77 was about the existence of (or the evidence for the 
existence of) a causal relationship between violent interactive video 
games and the incidence of violent conduct.  Unlike the contexts just 
described, in which the acts allegedly caused by speech are argued not 
to be harmful at all, here there was no claim that murder, rape, or grand 
theft were harmless activities.  Rather, this subbranch of the harmless 
speech tradition is manifested in a denial of the causal relationship 
between the speech and some category of uncontroversially harmful 
conduct.  This debate has surfaced for generations in the context of 
claims that images of a certain sort affect, in the aggregate, the societal 
levels of sexual violence,78 nonsexual violence,79 cigarette smoking,80 or 
alcohol consumption.81  The denial of the empirical causal relationship 
also seems implicit in Holmes’s characterization of Abrams and the 
group’s pamphlets, where Holmes appears to deny that what Abrams 
 
 75 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 76 Id. at 787–802. 
 77 Id. at 840 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 78 For my own stunningly unsuccessful attempt to clarify some of the issues, see 
Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 737 (1987). 
 79 For one side of these debates, see KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY: 
LIMITING THE MEDIA’S FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION (1996).  For the other side, empirically, 
doctrinally, and normatively, see, for example, Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, 
Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1487 (1995); L.A. Powe, Jr., American 
Voodoo: If Television Doesn’t Show It, Maybe It Won’t Exist, 59 TEX. L. REV. 879 (1981).  
 80 Compare, e.g., Jon P. Nelson, Cigarette Advertising Regulation: A Meta-Analysis, 26 
INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 195 (2006) (questioning the existence of causation), with Joe B. Tye, 
Kenneth E. Warner & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Advertising and Consumption: Evidence 
of a Causal Relationship, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 492 (1987) (finding causation). 
 81 Compare Leslie B. Snyder, Frances Fleming Milici, Michael Slater, Helen Sun & 
Yuliya Strizhakova, Effects of Alcohol Advertising Exposure on Drinking Among Youth, 160 
ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESC. MED. 18 (2006) (finding causation), with John E. Calfee & Carl 
Scheraga, The Influence of Advertising on Alcohol Consumption: A Literature Review and 
an Econometric Analysis of Four European Nations, 13 INT’L J. ADVERT. 287 (2015) (finding 
no causation). 
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and his colleagues urged would have an effect on behavior.82  And for all 
of these examples, and many more, the harmless speech tradition is one, 
Madison Avenue notwithstanding, that can be understood as denying 
the causal relationship between the speech and the conduct. 
Thirdly, some commentators will acknowledge the harmfulness of 
the ultimate conduct, and the causation between the speech and that 
conduct, but will seek to attribute the responsibility to the downstream 
actor and not to the upstream speaker.  Even if Clarence Brandenburg 
did cause some of his fellow Klansmen to commit acts of violence against 
African Americans and Jews, for example, the responsibility should be 
attributed to the listeners as “rational” agents with the capacity to 
decide what to do and not to the speakers nor the speech, mediated as 
it is by the autonomous decision-making capacities of the listeners.83 
There is much more to be said about these various branches and 
subbranches of the harmless speech tradition.  In the context of this 
Article and this Symposium, however, the basic points are that this 
tradition exists, that it was close to nonexistent before 1919, and that it 
is presented in bold form in Holmes’s Abrams dissent.  This is not to say, 
nor do we have good evidence for saying, that the Holmes opinion was 
causally responsible, for good or for ill, for the subsequent development 
and growth of the harmless speech tradition.  Still, the praise that the 
opinion attracts, and the frequency with which Holmes’s 
characterization of Abrams and his speech is quoted to support a claim 
of harmlessness, not only support the inference that Holmes was an 
early adopter of the harmless speech tradition but also suggests that the 
Abrams dissent was potentially a causal agent in the subsequent growth 
of a tradition that is now as influential as it is widespread. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There are various explanations for why Holmes might have 
referred to Jacob Abrams as an “unknown man” and why Holmes would 
have referred to the leaflets that formed the basis for the prosecution as 
“puny anonymities.”  One explanation, of course, is that these 
characterizations were true.  But I have tried to suggest here that such 
an explanation may be open to question.  And if that is so, then the 
 
 82 Abraham Lincoln apparently thought otherwise.  “Must I shoot a simple-minded 
soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him 
to desert?”  Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and others (June 12, 1863), 
in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, 454, 460 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).  And so 
did the Holmes of Schenck. 
 83 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 
13 CONST. COMMENT. 71 (1996); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational 
Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 813 (2010). 
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various alternative explanations I have offered here may shed light on 
why Holmes employed characterizations that seem, at the very least, to 
involve excess trivialization of the defendants and their activities.  
Holmes’s trivialization of Abrams and his leaflets can thus be seen 
as one of the initial landmarks in the harmless speech tradition.  And in 
helping to launch the harmless speech tradition, Holmes may himself 
have contributed to still another harm—the harm of believing that 
speech is harmless. 
 
